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HOW ANTITRUST LOST ITS GOAL 
Barak Orbach* 
“In the sea, once upon a time, O my Best Beloved, there was a Whale, and 
he ate fishes.”1 
 
During the first seven decades following the enactment of the Sherman 
Act, competition was the uncontroversial goal of antitrust.  The 
introduction of the consumer welfare standard led to the dissipation of 
“competition” as the goal of U.S. competition laws.  This Essay explores 
how antitrust lost the goal of competition and argues that this goal should 
be restored.  The Essay reevaluates several influential antitrust 
propositions.  First, while “consumer welfare” was offered as a remedy for 
reconciling contradictions and inconsistencies in antitrust, the adoption of 
the consumer welfare standard sparked an enduring controversy, causing 
confusion and doctrinal uncertainty.  In effect, the consumer welfare 
standard established the greatest antitrust paradox yet.  Second, the small-
business interests hypothesis, which has often been used to explain the 
enactment of the Sherman Act, is inconsistent with the well-documented 
historical record.  Third, the logic of Robert Bork’s consumer welfare thesis 
requires restoration of “competition” as the goal of antitrust.  The Essay 
concludes with a straightforward observation:  “consumer welfare” may 
continue serving as the stated goal of U.S. competition laws but, 
practically, antitrust has always been and will always be about the 
preservation of competition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
U.S. competition laws are known as “antitrust” because they were 
designed as measures against the nineteenth-century trusts.2  In 1979, 
quoting Robert Bork, the Supreme Court declared that “Congress designed 
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”3  Since then, 
“consumer welfare” has been the stated goal of U.S. competition laws.4 
Federal antitrust statutes stress the significance of competition and appear 
to declare the preservation of competition as their goal.  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits agreements in “restraint of trade.”5  Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act outlaws monopolization—that is, exclusion of competition.6  
Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act ban price discrimination, tying, and 
mergers that “may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to 
create a monopoly.”7  Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.”8  Indeed, antitrust inquiries 
have always focused on competitive effects, or at least this has been their 
perceived intent.  Correspondingly, the preservation of competition in 
business has always served as the most intuitive and obvious goal of 
competition laws.9 
Competition laws constitute one element of our regulatory system.10  
What is the normative function of competition laws in this system?  Could 
it be anything other than the preservation of competitive markets? 
Competition, however, is not the stated goal of antitrust law.  It is not 
even a meaningful contender as a potential goal in the debate over the goals 
studied by this Essay.  This debate has focused on several standards:  
consumer welfare, total welfare, consumer surplus, total surplus, and 
consumer choice.  Competition has been largely excluded from this list in 
 
 2. See generally Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of 
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012). 
 3. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)). 
 4. See generally Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 6. Id. § 2. 
 7. Id. § 18. 
 8. Id. § 45. 
 9. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLES AND 
EXECUTION 20 (2005) (“An antitrust statute that read[s] simply, ‘Unreasonable restraints on 
competition are hereby forbidden,’ would do all the work . . . .”); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW 260 (2d ed. 2001) (“An attractive alternative to . . . all . . . antitrust laws 
would . . . be a simple prohibition of unreasonably anticompetitive practices.”). 
 10. See generally BARAK ORBACH, REGULATION:  WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES 
(2012). 
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recent decades.11  Prior to the mid-1960s, there were occasional intellectual 
inquiries into goals of antitrust.  The broad understanding, however, had 
been that competition was the original and practical goal of U.S. 
competition laws, that is, antitrust.  At some point in the late 1970s, 
antitrust lost the goal of competition. 
How did antitrust lose the goal of competition?  This Essay explores this 
question, and perhaps the more puzzling question of why the debate over 
the goals of antitrust has largely ignored competition as a plausible or even 
reasonable goal for U.S. competition laws.  Finding that answer requires 
navigating through several logical glitches in the history of antitrust 
thinking.  The starting point on this path is Robert Bork. 
Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox12 influenced U.S. competition laws 
in many ways, including framing the stated goal of antitrust.  The Supreme 
Court endorsed the consumer welfare standard, relying on The Antitrust 
Paradox.  For Bork, “consumer welfare” meant “allocative efficiency,”13 
and “competition” meant “a shorthand expression for consumer welfare.”14  
Thus, he recommended, as a policy prescription, the term “consumer 
welfare” that allegedly “enables us to employ basic economic theory.”15  
“Consumer welfare,” however, turned out to be an ambiguous and 
confusing term.16 
The introduction of the consumer welfare standard sparked an enduring 
conceptual controversy in antitrust with broad doctrinal implications.  
While the term “consumer welfare” was offered to promote consistency and 
certainty in the application of antitrust laws, the underlying economic 
propositions of Bork’s thesis were flawed, and the adoption of the term as 
the goal of antitrust resulted in an array of new inconsistencies.  In the era 
of consumer welfare, many antitrust standards “sail on a sea of doubt,”17 
 
 11. To be sure, several antitrust scholars have argued that competition is or ought to be 
the goal of antitrust.  The argument, however, has not played a significant role in the 
controversy. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Private Interest Support for 
Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 218 (1992); Gregory J. Werden, 
Competition, Consumer Welfare & the Sherman Act, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87 (2008).  Alan 
Meese’s discussion of “competition on the merits” in section 2 of the Sherman Act is 
essentially about the goals of antitrust. Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare 
Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:  How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare 
Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); see also Alan J. 
Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 78 
(“Everyone knows that antitrust law should protect and further ‘competition.’”).  
 12. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
 13. Id. at 98. 
 14. Id. at 61. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Antitrust economics does not accommodate welfare analysis, although it may 
accommodate surplus analysis. See generally Orbach, supra note 4. 
 17. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(warning that the “relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness of restraints 
of trade,” namely, the adoption of the rule of reason standard, was to “set sail on a sea of 
doubt”).  For an expression of uncertainty in antitrust, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY:  SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN 
ACT vii (2008) (“Competition and consumers are best served if section 2 standards are 
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since the meaning of “consumer welfare” is ambiguous at best.  No court 
has ever seriously addressed the meaning of the term. 
The legislative history of the Sherman Act has been studied thoroughly 
during the past century.  There is broad agreement today, if not consensus, 
that the record does not support the historical claims that led to the adoption 
of the consumer welfare standard.  This Essay’s premise is that the 
historical record and the nature of the debate over the goals of antitrust are 
known.  For simplicity, this Essay addresses only parts of the record needed 
to explore the role of competition as a goal of antitrust. 
The inquiry in this Essay consists of two parts.  Part I explains how 
Congress enacted competition without addressing the merit of competition.  
This part describes the simplistic economic understanding at the end of the 
nineteenth century, when “no trusts” meant “competition.”  The rise and 
persistence of the consumer welfare standard illustrate why legislative 
intent may not be a desirable approach for modern law.  But to the extent 
that any court will ever reconsider the legislative history of the Sherman 
Act, the Essay argues that, considering the common economic 
understanding in 1890, antitrust legislation effectively meant intent to 
preserve competition.  In 1890, people distinguished between markets 
controlled by trusts and markets without restraints of trade (i.e., 
competition), where many sellers operate.  Part II shows that competition 
was understood as the goal of antitrust until the introduction of the 
consumer welfare standard.  It also presents the peculiar history of the 
consumer welfare standard in antitrust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sound, clear, objective, effective, and administrable.  After more than a century of evolution, 
section 2 standards have not entirely achieved these goals, and there has been a vigorous 
debate about the proper standards for evaluating unilateral conduct under section 2.”). 
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THE FOG 
PUCK, November 22, 1911 (depicting the uncertainty that the Sherman Act created for 
businesses). 
I.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING 
In his 1914 study of the Sherman Act, William Howard Taft argued that 
the “members of Congress who passed [the Sherman Act] made plain the 
object that they had in mind, and they used general expressions to 
accomplish it, which they thought had had definition in the existing law.”18 
“The evil to be remedied was manifest,”19 and the confusion, Taft 
maintained, was created later when the statute became “a football of party 
politics” and “[p]oliticians . . . seized upon phrases that would attract the 
public eye, the meaning of which in the law they [did] not themselves 
underst[and].”20  The confusion established by biased reconstruction of 
antitrust laws has indeed obscured the understanding of the goals of 
antitrust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 18. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1914). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
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PUCK, November 22, 1911 (the cover of the 1911 Thanksgiving Issue).  A prescription from 
“Taft, M.D.” to the trusts—“You must go on a strict diet cut out all rich food”—deprives the 
trusts of the restraint-of-trade feast, leaving them with the thin soup of competition.21 
A.  Who Drafted the Sherman Act? 
Under a certain statutory interpretation philosophy, which Robert Bork 
advanced, legislative intent can be inferred from the remote past and should 
direct courts today.22  Adhering to this philosophy, the Supreme Court 
 
 21. In 1911, the Taft Administration concluded two of the government’s most epic 
antitrust battles with the break of Standard Oil and the American Tobacco Company. 
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
 22. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 
(1989); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis:  Two Case 
Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 217, 223 (2010) (“Judge Bork’s attention to the original understanding of the 
Sherman Act and the Court’s embrace of that view brought order to antitrust law, and 
originalists have since applied that method to other areas of law.” (citation omitted)); 
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adopted the consumer welfare standard as the goal of antitrust, believing 
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
prescription.’”23  Our inquiry begins with the plausibility of this belief. 
Who drafted the Sherman Act?  What was the legislative intent of the 
members of the 51st Congress that passed it?  The enactment of the 
Sherman Act involved a lengthy, multiphase process.  The individuals who 
secured its passage engaged in substantial committee work, delicate 
negotiations, the usual political deals and compromises, and inevitable 
political quarrels.  The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 52 to 1, with 29 
Senators absent.24  It passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 242 
to 0, with 85 members choosing not to vote.25  The overwhelming public 
support for the anti-trust bill made voting against it a risky choice for 
politicians with aspirations for reelection.26  It would be naïve to attribute a 
single intent to Congress in such a complex process.27 
Many scholars and courts have used the statements of Senator Sherman 
(R-Ohio) to interpret the Sherman Act.  For example, in United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America28 (Alcoa), Judge Learned Hand attributed great 
significance to the fact that “[i]n the debates in Congress Senator Sherman 
himself . . . showed that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a 
desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the 
helplessness of the individual before them.”29  Similarly, Robert Bork 
insisted that “[Senator] Sherman was the prime mover in getting antitrust 
legislation considered and pressed through the Senate.”30  Accordingly, 
Bork’s explicit research premise was that the “views of Senator Sherman 
. . . [were] crucial to an understanding of the intent underlying the law that 
bears his name.”31  But, as Hans Thorelli pointed out, “[t]hat Sherman was 
 
Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1990) (“Bork fail[ed] 
to produce convincing reasons why society should want its judges to adopt originalism as 
their interpretive methodology in constitutional cases.”). 
 23. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
 24. 21 CONG. REC. 3153 (Apr. 8, 1890). 
 25. Id. at 6314. 
 26. Senator Rufus Blodgett (D-New Jersey), who voted against the bill, was not a 
candidate for reelection.  During the debate over the Sherman Act he served as a railroad 
executive. See Ex-Senator Blodgett Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1910, at 11. 
 27. See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) (“Looking 
simply at the history of the [Sherman] bill from the time it was introduced in the senate until 
it was finally passed, it would be impossible to say what were the views of a majority of the 
members of each house in relation to the meaning of the act. . . .  All that can be determined 
from the debates and reports is that various members had various views, and we are left to 
determine the meaning of this act, as we determine the meaning of other acts, from the 
language used therein.”). 
 28. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 29. Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
 30. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7, 14, 45–47 (1966). 
 31. Id. at 14.  Bork acknowledged that the Judiciary Committee “completely rephrased” 
Sherman’s bill, but argued that “the final bill, in its substantive policy aspects, embodied 
Sherman’s views.” Id. at 14–15. 
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not the author of the act is clear to any intelligent reader of the 
Congressional Record.”32 
Although Senator Sherman introduced two antitrust bills and was a 
strong supporter of antitrust legislation, he was critical of the antitrust bill 
that bears his name.  He barely voted for it.  When the final bill was brought 
to the Senate for a vote, Senator Sherman stated: 
I do not intend to open any debate on the subject, but I wish to state that, 
after having fairly and fully considered the amendment proposed by the 
Committee on the Judiciary, I shall vote for it, not as being precisely what 
I want, but as the best under all the circumstances that the Senate is 
prepared to give in this direction.  Therefore, without enlarging or 
entering into debate, I shall vote for the proposition of the Judiciary 
Committee as it stands.33 
In 1890, it was transparent to the public that, while Senator Sherman 
introduced anti-trust bills,34 the drafting of the final bill and the political 
persuasion were done by others.  For example, after the Senate voted for the 
bill, The Washington Post wrote:  “As the bill went to the Judiciary 
Committee it was a Sherman bill; as it came back from the Judiciary 
Committee it was principally an Edmunds bill.”35  The Washington Post 
further explained Sherman’s ethical struggle:  “The Ohio Senator accepted 
the situation with the best grace he could.”36  Other newspapers printed a 
statement that Senator Sherman released in which he used much stronger 
language, denouncing the “substitute for the Sherman bill” and stating that 
it would be “totally ineffective in dealing with combinations and Trusts.”37  
Senator Sherman was so disappointed in the substitute for his bill that he 
stated that he was “giv[ing] up hope of seeing any legislation . . . [capable 
of coping] with the Trust evil.”38 
Senators George Edmunds (R-Vermont) and George Hoar (R-
Massachusetts) were the principal drafters of the statute we know today as 
the Sherman Act.39  The two were members of the Judiciary Committee that 
redrafted the anti-trust bill.  Edmunds chaired the Committee.  Other 
members of the Committee, such as Senator George Vest (D-Missouri), 
also contributed to the drafting and passage of the bill.  Their statements are 
 
 32. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 211 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 33. 21 CONG. REC. 3145 (Apr. 8, 1890). 
 34. S. 1, 51st Cong. (1st Sess. 1889); S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1st Sess. 1888). 
 35. The Anti-trust Bill, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1890, at 4.  Senator George Edmunds (R-
Vermont) chaired the Judiciary Committee. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Mr. Sherman Gives Up Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1890, at 4 (quoting Senator 
Sherman). 
 38. Id. (quoting ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT). 
 39. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 94–95 (1965); Felix 
H. Levy, The Federal Anti-trust Law and the “Rule of Reason,” 1 VA. L. REV. 188, 188 
(1913); see also Mr. Sherman Gives Up Hope, supra note 37. 
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consistent with Sherman’s statements:  They felt that it was odd that the 
celebrated statute was called the “Sherman Act.”40 
Thus, although Senator Sherman earned historical credit for inspiring the 
congressional campaign that led to the enactment of the first federal 
antitrust statute, he did not draft the bill passed by Congress nor did he like 
it much.41  His views of competition laws cannot seriously be considered 
the “legislative intent” of the Sherman Act. 
Nevertheless, many scholars and courts have used statements from the 
debate over Senator Sherman’s bill—which Congress did not pass—to infer 
Congress’s legislative intent in passing the Judiciary Committee’s bill.42  
Robert Bork was one of these scholars.  He argued that the policy of the 
first bill “was carried forward into the Judiciary Committee’s draft and 
enacted.”43  Senator Sherman and members of the Judiciary Committee 
clearly did not feel this way.  Senator Sherman’s perspective did not reflect 
the legislative intent of the Sherman Act. 
Indeed, any “intelligent reader of the Congressional Record” ought to be 
aware of the discrepancy between the title of the Sherman Act and its 
history.44  Many antitrust scholars and practitioners are familiar with this 
history.45  The notion that one can extract from the Congressional Record 
“legislative intent” that has not been considered before is somewhat 
implausible.  It was also implausible when the Supreme Court adopted the 
consumer welfare standard with no analysis, departing from the Court’s 
long-established understanding of the goal of antitrust laws. 
B.  The State of Economic Thinking in 1890 
Senator Sherman’s anti-trust bills proposed that “all arrangements, 
contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . made with a view, or 
which tend, to prevent full and free competition . . . or . . . designed, or 
which tend to advance the cost to the consumer” would be void.46  When 
the Judiciary Committee returned the revised bill on April 2, 1890, it no 
longer contained the word “competition.”47  By passing the Sherman Act, 
the 51st Congress enacted competition law without talking about 
 
 40. See, e.g., 36 CONG. REC. 522 (Jan. 6, 1903) (statement of Senator Hoar) (“It was so 
called . . . lucus a non lucendo, because Mr. Sherman had nothing to do with it whatever.”); 
id. at 523 (statement of Senator Hoar) (a similar comment); 2 GEORGE F. HOAR, 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 363 (1903) (discrediting Sherman’s role in the drafting 
of the “1890 law” and ridiculing its common name); Vest Talks on Tariff, WASH. POST, Dec. 
25, 1902, at 3 (“It is odd that the name of the late Senator Sherman should be coupled to a 
measure which he conspicuously opposed and refused to vote for.”). 
 41. THORELLI, supra note 32, at 210–14. 
 42. For the conceptual flaws of this approach, see id. at 214–19. 
 43. Bork, supra note 30, at 45. 
 44. THORELLI, supra note 32, at 211. 
 45. In 1902, the U.S. Attorney-General Office published a book that organized and 
indexed the Congressional Record. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, BILLS AND DEBATES IN 
CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS (1902). 
 46. S. 1, 51st Cong. (1st Sess. 1889); S. 3445, 50th Cong. (2d Sess. 1888). 
 47. 21 CONG. REC. 2901 (Apr. 2, 1890). 
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competition.48  The members of Congress undoubtedly intended to address 
the “trust problem,” but their lack of direct discussion of the merits of 
competition is puzzling. 
Under public pressure, the 51st Congress debated anti-trust legislation.  
Many members of the Congress, although not all, were hostile to “trusts and 
combinations,” expressing determination to relieve the public from their 
burden.  It is far from clear that all lawmakers fully understood the 
economic meaning of “anti-trust legislation.”  At the time, the “trusts 
problem” generally meant restraints of trade, high prices, limited 
production, low wages, losses to small businesses, and other forms of 
perceived economic oppression.  “No trusts” generally meant a state of 
competition, freedom from restraints of trade, low prices, better conditions 
of supply, and prosperity opportunities.  “Competition” was an abstract 
concept that generally meant absence of restraints of trade.49  For example, 
before the Senate voted on the Judiciary Committee’s bill, Senator Hoar 
stated:  “The great thing that this bill does, except affording remedy, is to 
extend the common-law principles, which protected fair competition in 
trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce 
. . . .”50 
Senator Sherman, the drafters of the Sherman Act, and other lawmakers 
unequivocally expressed a desire to fight trusts and combinations through 
legislation.51  They were convinced that the United States would do better 
without them because of the belief that in a state of competition, where 
there are many businesses, prices are low and production is high.  They did 
not question these premises and had no analytical tools to do so.52 
The economic thinking of the members of the 51st Congress was not far 
behind that of economists at the time.  The concepts of “price,” “rent,” and 
 
 48. THORELLI, supra note 32, at 225–32. 
 49. See generally id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of 
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989). 
 50. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (Apr. 8, 1890) (statement of Senator Hoar) (emphasis added). 
 51. In his 1903 autobiography, Senator Hoar stated that the concern that motivated him 
in drafting the “law of 1890” was “the grave evil of the accumulation . . . of vast fortunes in 
single hands.” 2 HOAR, supra note 40, at 363.  Hoar criticized the Supreme Court’s strict 
interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, noting that the Judiciary Committee expected 
courts to treat the “words ‘agreements in restraint of trade’ as having a technical meaning, 
such as they [were] supposed to have in England.” Id. at 364; see also TAFT, supra note 18, 
at 2 (arguing that the enactment of the Sherman Act “was a step taken by Congress to meet 
what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable evil”).  In 1890, Taft served as the 
U.S. Solicitor General.  For a general analysis of the “trust problem,” see Wayne D. Collins, 
Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279 (2013). 
 52. At least formally, both the Democrats and Republicans denounced the trusts.  In 
August 1888, a day after Senator Sherman introduced his first antitrust bill, James G. Blaine, 
a prominent Republican politician, criticized President Cleveland’s concerns regarding the 
“danger” of the trusts.  Blaine ridiculed the Democrats’ approach to the trusts, stating that 
the trusts are “largely private affairs with which neither President Cleveland nor any private 
citizen has any particular right to interfere.” Mr. Blaine’s Work Begun, NY TIMES, Aug. 16, 
1888, at 2.  Blaine’s speech was shortly before the 1888 elections and drew a lot of negative 
publicity to which the Republican Party responded by a formal denouncement of the trusts. 
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“competition” were still in rudimentary form.  Economists used and wrote 
about them but in an intuitive manner.53 
In 1898, Irving Fisher published the translation of Cournot’s celebrated 
work on the mathematical principles of economics.54  Using Cournot’s 
simplistic framework, economists tied market shares to market power, 
developing formal explanations for monopolists’ power over prices.55  This 
analytical framework was not available in 1890.  Rather, when Congress 
debated the Sherman Act, economists sharply distinguished between trusts 
(monopoly) and competition.56  Some prominent economists, like John 
Bates Clark, defended the trusts and monopolies, expressing confidence in 
the effectiveness of potential competition and other theories.57  Overall, it is 
fair to state that, when Congress considered the Sherman Act, American 
economists mostly held an intuitive understanding that monopolies lead to 
high prices, while competition in the form of a marketplace with many 
sellers drives prices down.58  With such intuitions, the protection of small 
 
 53. See, e.g., Frank T. Carlton, Price and Rent, 26 Q.J. ECON. 523 (1912); J.H. 
Hollander, The Concept of Marginal Rent, 9 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1895); John Ise, Monopoly 
Elements in Rent, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 33 (1940); C. W. MacFarlance, Rent and Profit, 5 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 90 (1894); Alfred Marshall, On Rent, 3 ECON. J. 74 
(1893); see also LETWIN, supra note 39, at 71–77 (reviewing the dominant positions among 
American economists about competition, monopoly, and trust when the Sherman Act was 
enacted); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. 
ECON. 1 (1957) (reviewing the history of the term “competition” and noting that it “entered 
economics from common discourse, and for long it connoted only the independent rivalry of 
two or more persons.”); Robert H. Wessel, A Note on Economic Rent, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
1221 (1967) (reviewing the confusion surrounding the concept of “economic rent”). 
 54. AUGUSTINE COURNOT, RECHERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHÉMATIQUES DE LA 
THÉORIE DES RICHESSES (1838); Irving Fisher, Cournot and Mathematical Economics, 12 
Q.J. ECON. 119 (1898).  Fisher’s wife’s brother-in-law translated the book.  Fisher added 
notes to the publications. See Irving Fisher, Cournot Forty Years Ago, 6 ECONOMETRICA 198 
(1938).  In 1927, The MacMillan Company started publishing the translations and notes as a 
book that became very popular. See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE 
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see also A.J. Nichol, Tragedies in the Life of Cournot, 6 ECONOMETRICA 193 (1938) 
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 55. See, e.g., Orbach & Rebling, supra note 2, at 633–39; Stigler, supra note 53, at 5–6. 
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Beneficence, 2 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 55 (1901) (addressing the meaning of “competition” 
as the President of the American Economic Association).  In 1935, Frank Knight was still 
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ETHICS OF COMPETITION 41 (1935). 
 57. See, e.g., JOHN BATES CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS v (1901); John Bates Clark, 
Trusts, 15 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 182 (1900); J.B. Clark, The “Trust”:  A New Agent for Doing an 
Old Work:  Or Freedom Doing the Work of Monopoly, 16 NEW ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 
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CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS vii (rev. ed. 1914). 
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businesses may seem to serve competition.  Small businesses allegedly 
contributed to competition, as it was understood at the time. 
Over the years, some commentators identified in the Congressional 
Record modern economic concepts that are too nuanced to be extracted 
from the abstract thinking of the late nineteenth century.59  Most 
prominently, the consumer welfare standard emerged from such attribution 
of contemporary meaning to phrases that the members of Congress used 
while discussing the trust problem.60 
C.  Under the Shadow of the Great Tariff Debates 
The nineteenth century misunderstanding of basic economic principles 
cannot be overstated.  Some context can illustrate why modern concepts 
and intuitions do not apply to the thinking of the members of the 51st 
Congress. 
The first Sherman bill was introduced in the background of the “Great 
Tariff Debate of 1888”61 and was considered in the shadow of a heated 
controversy over tariff bills.  The tariff debates stressed the rents that the 
nineteenth-century trusts extracted through protectionist policies that 
affected consumer prices and the cost of living as a whole.  The tariff 
debates also highlighted the contrast between two concepts that were 
associated with the trusts—“free trade” with foreign nations that the trusts 
used political influence to stifle and “restraints of trade” that the trusts 
developed and preserved. 
In the late 1880s, the pressing problem that troubled the United States 
was a growing fiscal surplus—national revenues exceeded expenditures by 
over 40 percent.62  Congress believed that changes to the tariff policy were 
necessary to address the problem.  The Democrats proposed reductions in 
existing tariffs to foster competition, lower prices for consumers, and 
elimination of protectionism.  The Republicans argued that tariff reductions 
 
 59. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in 
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989).  For a 
general discussion of economic thinking in the second-half of the nineteenth century see 
SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE:  A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN 
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865–1901 (1956). 
 60. See Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act:  A Re-
examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359 (1993); Robert H. 
Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82–106 (1982) (explaining why the 
Congressional Record does not support the consumer welfare thesis). 
 61. Representative William Springer (D-Illinois), who chaired the Committee of the 
Whole, named the debate. 19 CONG. REC. 6519 (July 14, 1888) (statement of Rep. William 
Springer) (“This debate will perhaps be known as the most remarkable that ever occurred in 
our parliamentary history.  It . . . shall be known as ‘The Great Tariff Debate of 1888.’”).  
This description of the Great Tariff Debate of 1888 draws from JOANNE REITANO, THE 
TARIFF QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE:  THE GREAT DEBATE OF 1888 (1994); 2 EDWARD 
STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 192–295 
(1903). 
 62. Douglas A. Irwin, Higher Tariffs, Lower Revenues?  Analyzing the Fiscal Aspects of 
“The Great Tariff Debate of 1888,” 58 J. ECON. HIST. 59, 59 (1998). 
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would stimulate imports, thereby increasing government revenues, harming 
American industries, and adversely affecting local wages.  The 
Republicans, therefore, proposed tariff increases to reduce government 
revenues and protect American industries from foreign competition. 
In December 1887, President Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, delivered 
his third State of the Union Address (then called an “Annual Message”).63  
Cleveland dedicated his entire address to the tariff laws, which he described 
as a “vicious, inequitable, and illogical source of unnecessary taxation.”64 
The President further explained that the “primary and plain effect [of the 
tariff laws was to] raise the price to consumers” of all imported goods.65  
“[T]he increase of the cost of living,” he argued, “caused by such tariff 
becomes a burden upon those with moderate means and the poor, the 
employed and unemployed, the sick and well, and the young and old, and 
that it constitutes a tax.”66  The President explained that competition among 
local producers sometimes had a positive effect on prices.  He pointed out, 
however, that “it is notorious that this competition is too often strangled by 
combinations . . . frequently called trusts.”67 
President Cleveland’s address sparked the Great Tariff Debate of 1888.  
Congress spent much of 1888, until the presidential election, debating a 
tariff bill.  Senator Sherman introduced his first anti-trust bill during this 
period.68 
 The 1888 elections indeed focused on the tariff policy.  The Democratic 
platform pledged tariff reductions,69 arguing that “domestic industries and 
enterprises should not and need not be endangered by the reduction and 
correction of the burdens of taxation.”70  The Democratic platform 
expressly argued that the high tariffs served the trusts at the expense of the 
public:  “Judged by Democratic principles, the interests of the people are 
betrayed when, by unnecessary taxation, trusts and combinations are 
permitted to exist, which, while unduly enriching the few that combine, rob 
the body of our citizens by depriving them of the benefits of natural 
competition.”71 
The platform of the Republican Party included an unequivocal pledge to 
protectionism:  “We are uncompromisingly in favor of the American 
system of protection; we protest against its destruction as proposed by the 
President and his party.  They serve the interests of Europe; we will support 
 
 63. President’s Annual Message, 19 CONG. REC. 9 (Dec. 6, 1887). 
 64. Id. at 10.  It was the first time in U.S. history that the President devoted the State of 
the Union Address to a single topic. Stanwood, supra note 61, at 226. 
 65. President’s Annual Message, supra note 63. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (2d Sess. 1888). 
 69. THOMAS HUDSON MCKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF ALL 
POLITICAL PARTIES:  1789 TO 1904, at 233, 235–36 (5th ed. 1904). 
 70. Id. at 235. 
 71. Id. 
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the interests of America.”72  Notably, at the same time, the Republican 
Party also denounced the trusts and declared unequivocal support for anti-
trust legislation: 
We declare our opposition to all combinations of capital, organized in 
trusts or otherwise, to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among our 
citizens; and we recommend to Congress and the state legislatures . . . 
such legislation as will prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the 
people by undue charges on their supplies, or by unjust rates for the 
transportation of their products to market.  We approve the legislation by 
Congress to prevent alike unjust burdens and unfair discriminations 
between the states.73 
In November 1888, U.S. voters elected the 51st Congress that passed the 
Sherman Act.  The Republican Party scored a big victory, taking the White 
House and the two chambers of Congress.  Much of the first session of the 
51st Congress was dedicated to debates over the Tariff Act of 1890—the 
“McKinley Act,”74 which was passed on October 1, 1890.  Congress also 
debated and passed the Sherman Act during this period.75  The McKinley 
Act substantially raised tariffs, but it did not accomplish the hoped-for 
result:  revenues from imported goods that were subject to duties 
increased.76 
The Republican Party controlled the drafting and championed the 
passage of the Sherman Act.  Its members saw no inconsistency between 
anti-trust legislation and protectionist policies that strengthened the trusts.  
They expressly dismissed the notion that pro-trust protectionism affected 
prices to the consumer.77  Reflecting on the first years of the Sherman Act 
in 1903, Senator Hoar argued that there was “no time” to deliberate the 
Sherman Act because of the pressure “to get it through.”78  Hoar 
acknowledged that the enactment of the statute required significant 
compromises, but stressed that a remedy for “evils from the trusts” was 
needed.  He believed that this had “been accomplished.”79 
In sum, it may be fair to state that the members of the 51st Congress did 
not fully understand the significance of the Sherman Act, although they 
understood that its effects on trusts would be meaningful for the American 
economy, and they intended to serve the public—consumers and 
competitors of the trusts. 
 
 72. Id. at 240. 
 73. Id. at 241. 
 74. See ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890). 
 75. See ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). 
 76. Irwin, supra note 62, at 70. 
 77. Thomas Hazlett identified in the inconsistency between the tariff policy and the 
antitrust legislation support for the position that “the Sherman Act was not part of generally 
pro-consumer campaign to remedy market power in the U.S. economy.” Thomas W. Hazlett, 
The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined, 30 ECON. INQ. 263, 273 (1992).  
Rather, he argued that it was a “political compromise” that “was not thought to do much 
more than codify and federalize the common law.” Id.  
 78. 2 HOAR, supra note 40, at 366. 
 79. Id. 
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D.  The Small-Business Interests Hypothesis 
During the past three decades, a line of influential academic publications 
has established a belief that Congress enacted the Sherman Act to serve the 
interests of small, less-efficient businesses that could not compete with the 
trusts.80  Some of the most frequently cited works that allegedly support the 
argument make modest claims related to the potential role of interest groups 
in the political process but do not propose that the Sherman Act was 
enacted to serve small interest groups.81  The small-business interests 
hypothesis is no more plausible than the consumer welfare standard.  It 
mostly builds on out-of-context quotes of lawmakers’ concerns for 
competitors of the trusts. 
Political debates are noisy, reflecting diverse interests and producing a 
wide range of allegations and statements.82  During the enactment of the 
Sherman Act, Congress expressly debated pro-trust protectionism.  
Proponents of pro-trust protectionism controlled Congress and, in fact, 
drafted the Sherman Act.  The small-business interests hypothesis isolates 
certain statements and arguments made during these debates that could be 
interpreted as support for small-business protectionism.  It is a simplistic 
hypothesis that reduces a complex political and economic history into a 
one-dimensional explanation.83 
In the late nineteenth century, politicians often considered harm to small 
businesses as an indication of the harm that the trusts inflicted on the 
economy.  For example, Senator Hoar’s speeches, letters, and 
autobiography reflect a strong conviction that the “grave evil of the 
accumulation . . . of vast fortunes in single hands” affected the American 
people and required remedy.84  To illustrate this point, Senator Hoar wrote 
in his autobiography:  “It is said that one man in this country has acquired a 
fortune of more than a thousand million dollars by getting an advantage 
over other producers or dealers . . . .”85  Similarly, in one of the debates in 
the House of Representatives, Congressman William Mason charged that 
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 83. It is only fair to note that the starting point of at least some of the papers that 
advanced this hypothesis was that “antitrust laws . . . often hinder rather than improve 
economic efficiency.” DiLorenzo, supra note 80, at 73. 
 84. 2 HOAR, supra note 40, at 363. 
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the trusts had “destroyed legitimate [business] competition and [drove] 
honest men from legitimate business enterprises.”86  But Hoar, Mason, and 
others did not enact the Sherman Act to serve the interest of small 
businesses.  Rather, they believed that the trusts were “robbing” all 
segments of society, including small businesses. 
 
Homer Davenport, 1890 (depicting the perceived effect of the trusts on national prosperity). 
 
II.  THE TRANSITION FROM “COMPETITION” TO “CONSUMER WELFARE” 
In 1890, Congress passed a competition law without meaningfully 
talking about competition.  In 1979, the Supreme Court revised the standard 
of competition regulation without talking about competition or the 
implications of the revision.  Both transitions involved the use of popular 
phrases that, at the time, had significant political capital.  In 1890, the 
phrase was “anti-trust,” and in 1979 it was “consumer welfare.”  In 1979, 
per Robert Bork’s prescription, antitrust was reframed to resolve the 
confusion created by the word “competition” through the use of the phrase 
“consumer welfare.” Alas, the prescription’s underlying logic was circular, 
and its confusing consequences could have been anticipated. 
 
 86. 21 CONG. REC. 4100 (May 1, 1890) (statement of Rep. William Mason); DiLorenzo, 
supra note 80, at 80–81. 
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A.  The Decline of Competition 
The 1955 report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study 
the Antitrust Laws opened with a simple statement:  “The general objective 
of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open markets.”87  The 
Committee further stated that the antitrust legislation established a “policy 
‘against undue limitations on competitive conditions.’”88  Indeed, until the 
introduction of the consumer welfare standard in the mid-1960s, the notion 
that competition was the goal of U.S. competition laws appeared to be 
uncontroversial.89  Prominent antitrust thinkers, including Thurman 
Arnold,90 Donald Dewey,91 Milton Handler,92 Richard Hofstadter,93 Alfred 
Kahn,94 Carl Kaysen, and Donald Turner,95 described competition as the 
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policy of competition.  Sixty-five years later, that Act is still the central core of American 
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promotes efficiencies not easily recognized or proved. 
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unquestionable goal of antitrust.  Antitrust courts also repeatedly referred to 
competition as the goal of U.S. competition laws.96  The famous exception 
is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. 
United States,97 where he stated that the Sherman Act “says nothing about 
competition.”98  But Justice Holmes never “disguise[d] [his] belief that the 
Sherman Act [was] a humbug based on economic ignorance and 
incompetence.”99 
In April 1978, a year before the Supreme Court adopted the consumer 
welfare standard, the Court handed down its decision in National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States (NSPE).100  The NSPE decision 
addressed the argument that “a learned profession” could impose 
restrictions on competition among its members “for the purpose of 
minimizing the risk that competition would produce inferior . . . work 
endangering the public safety.”101  Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul 
Stevens dismissed the argument, stating that “the statutory policy precludes 
inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.”102  He 
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explained that “[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that 
ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better 
goods and services.”103  Justice Stevens went further, holding that, under 
antitrust law, competition analysis is narrow and does not include welfare 
effects.  In his words: 
In our complex economy the number of items that may cause serious 
harm is almost endless—automobiles, drugs, foods, aircraft components, 
heavy equipment, and countless others, cause serious harm to individuals 
or to the public at large if defectively made.  The judiciary cannot 
indirectly protect the public against this harm by conferring monopoly 
privileges on the manufacturers.104 
Put simply, the NSPE Court indirectly, but quite explicitly, rejected the 
consumer welfare thesis.  The NSPE Court, however, mostly stated the 
Supreme Court’s traditional understanding of antitrust.  It did not offer any 
analysis of the goals. 
The status of competition as the goal of antitrust faded until it vanished 
following the introduction of the consumer welfare standard.  When Robert 
Bork launched his critique of antitrust in a 1963 essay with Ward Bowman, 
they depicted antitrust as a “policy of preserving competition.”105  Bork and 
Bowman explained that “we want to preserve competition . . . .  [because it] 
provides society with the maximum output that can be achieved at any 
given time with the resources at its command.”106  Bork and Bowman, 
therefore, considered competition to be the goal of antitrust. 
The Bork-Bowman essay drew attention and criticism.107  Defending 
their position and advancing his critique of antitrust, Robert Bork argued in 
a different article that he and Bowman were troubled by “two very different 
theories [in antitrust] of how competition may be injured.”108  From that 
point, he developed the thesis that antitrust courts had been inconsistently 
using the concept of “competition,” frequently contradicting each other. 
Summarizing his antitrust framework in the 1978 Antitrust Paradox, 
Bork dismissed the usefulness of the word “competition” in antitrust:  “The 
fact that judges, like the rest of us, have used the word to mean very 
different things has resulted in the fruitless discourse of men talking past 
each other.”109  He, therefore concluded that “[p]art of the confusion about 
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[the] goals [of antitrust] arises from the ambiguity of the word 
‘competition’ . . . .”110  Phrased differently, Bork posited that the concept of 
“competition” is too ambiguous to be used as the goal of competition law.  
This proposition has been effectively governing antitrust law since 1979. 
Frank Knight, one of the founders of the Chicago School of Economics, 
was a critic of the use of the word “competition” in economics and argued 
that the word lacked any clear definition.111  Bork’s critique of the word 
“competition” in antitrust is quite similar.  Bork identified five meanings of 
the word “competition” that antitrust courts allegedly had been using:  
(1) the process of rivalry, (2) the absence of restraint over a person’s 
economic activities by another person, (3) perfect competition as defined in 
economics, (4) “fragmented industries and markets,” and (5) “any state of 
affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an 
alternative state of affairs through judicial decree.”112  Bork concluded that 
we are “compelled” to accept the fifth meaning, finding that “[t]he 
legislative history of the Sherman Act . . . displays the clear and exclusive 
policy intention of promoting consumer welfare.”113  The inevitable 
conclusion was that “competition” is “a shorthand expression for consumer 
welfare.”114  Bork’s claims sparked the controversy over the goals of 
antitrust law. 
Legal rules, including precedents lag behind developments in economics 
(and other sciences).  Observing this pattern in antitrust, but depicting it as 
an irresponsiveness of antitrust law to economics, Bork charged that “[t]he 
life of the antitrust law . . . [is] neither logic nor experience but bad 
economics and worse jurisprudence.”115  Until the mid-1960s, antitrust 
jurisprudence was indeed deficient.  But since the mid-1960s, the consumer 
welfare controversy has itself been an even greater impediment to the 
development of antitrust jurisprudence.  This stated goal of antitrust—its 
core concept—is foreign to antitrust economics.  Thus, Bork’s own words 
offer a conclusion:  “If I am correct, reform is needed, but it need not come 
from Congress.  Antitrust policy is determined . . . by the Supreme 
Court.”116  The Supreme Court should reconsider the consumer welfare 
standard it erroneously adopted. 
B.  The Emergence of the Consumer Welfare Standard 
The phrase “consumer welfare” entered common use after the Great 
Depression.  The frequency of its use in American publications fluctuated 
until the early 1970s and then skyrocketed with the social regulation 
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revolution.117  Robert Bork introduced the consumer welfare thesis before 
the phrase “consumer welfare” acquired political significance in the United 
States.  For Bork, the phrase “consumer welfare” meant “allocative 
efficiency.”118  A few years after Bork presented his thesis of the legislative 
intent of the Sherman Act, the phrase “consumer welfare” acquired a 
popular cultural meaning referring to the buyer’s well being:  the benefits a 
buyer derives from the consumption of goods and services, or more 
casually, the individual’s well being.119  This meaning is not equivalent to 
allocative efficiency, of course. 
Source:  Google Ngram120 
 
In the mid-1970s, when the phrase “consumer welfare” was gaining 
popularity, Robert Bork served as the U.S. Solicitor General.  In 1977, 
toward the end of his term, the Ninth Circuit, in Boddicker v. Arizona State 
Dental Ass’n,121 reasoned that serving the public is the goal of the Sherman 
Act.122  The court supported this claim with a footnote that stated:  “In an 
exhaustive study of the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act, 
Professor Robert H. Bork, the current Solicitor General of the United 
States, concluded [that the] ‘legislative history [of the Sherman Act] 
contains no colorable support for application by courts of any value, 
premise or policy other than the maximization of consumer welfare.’”123  In 
other words, the Ninth Circuit effectively equated Bork’s consumer welfare 
with the public welfare. 
 
 117. “Social regulation” addresses externalities, including aspects of antidiscrimination, 
consumer protection, workplace safety, and environmental preservation. See generally 
ORBACH, supra note 10, at 275–77.  In 1970, Richard Posner published a paper about 
“antitrust policy and the consumer movement.”  This paper echoed changes in the 
perceptions of “consumer welfare.” See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Consumer Movement, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 361 (1970). 
 118. BORK, supra note 12, at 98. 
 119. See Orbach, supra note 4, at 137–42. 
 120. For the methodology and its limitations, see Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., Quantitative 
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 331 SCIENCE 176 (2011). 
 121. 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 122. Id. at 632. 
 123. Id. at 632 n.10 (citing Bork, supra note 30, at 10). 
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By the end of the 1970s, the phrase “consumer welfare” had gained 
substantial political capital.  In 1979, in Reiter v. Sonotone,124 the Supreme 
Court examined the question of whether consumers who paid higher prices 
as a result of antitrust violations were injured within the meaning of section 
4 of the Clayton Act.  The Petitioners argued that consumers have standing 
under antitrust laws and can recover treble damages.125  In support of their 
position they cited the footnote from the Boddicker.126  The federal 
government filed an amicus brief in support of the Petitioners.127  The 
government took the position that the “primary purpose of the Sherman Act 
was consumer protection.”128  It supported this position with quotes from 
the Congressional Record that referred to consumers and prices.  
Concluding the argument, the government wrote that “‘[t]he Sherman Act 
was clearly presented and debated as a consumer welfare prescription.’”129  
The Supreme Court adopted the claim and declared:  “Congress designed 
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”130  
Frank Easterbrook, for whom The Antitrust Paradox was “a legal 
blueprint,”131 served as a Deputy Solicitor General and signed the 
government’s amicus brief as one of its authors.132  In his academic writing, 
Easterbrook argued that, “[h]owever you slice the legislative history, the 
dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges.”133  He 
believed that courts “should do their best to have a sensible, consistent 
program.  That means a single goal, for a program,” and warned that 
“[g]oals based on something other than efficiency (or its close proxy 
consumers’ welfare) really call on judges to redistribute income.”134  
Notwithstanding, with this conceptual framework, Easterbrook also 
declared that “[t]he goal of antitrust is to perfect the operation of 
competitive markets.”135  
The record, therefore, shows that Bork’s incorrect equation of “consumer 
welfare” with “efficiency” and “competition” lies at the foundation of 
“consumer welfare” as the goal of antitrust.  In Reiter, with no discussion, 
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the Supreme Court adopted “consumer welfare” as a new standard for 
regulation of competition, effectively replacing the original standard of 
“competition.” 
Since Reiter, “consumer welfare” is the stated goal of the U.S 
competition laws.  What it means we do not know.136  The phrase 
“consumer welfare” has mostly served as a source of debate among antitrust 
scholars but has no accepted meaning in antitrust.  The history of the 
consumer welfare standard undermines its validity and its rationalization 
defies common sense. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislative intent of the Sherman Act does not support Bork’s 
consumer welfare thesis.  Nevertheless, for more than three decades 
antitrust courts have been referring to “consumer welfare” as the original 
purpose of the Sherman Act and its present goal, while scholars have been 
debating the meaning of the phrase. 
The origins of the consumer welfare standard are in the argument that the 
concept of “competition” is too confusing to serve as the goal of U.S. 
competition laws.  This perceived confusion led to a convoluted set of 
propositions that resulted in “consumer welfare” as a policy prescription for 
antitrust because it “enables us to employ basic economic theory.”137  The 
alleged rationale, like its underlying propositions, has no foundation in 
established economics.  If anything, “consumer welfare” has been a source 
of confusion and controversy in antitrust.  While offered as a remedy for 
reconciling confusion and contrasts in antitrust, the introduction of the 
consumer welfare standard effectively placed antitrust at war with itself. 
In 1993, Robert Bork supplemented The Antitrust Paradox.  He declared 
that the “crisis in antitrust” that inspired his original critique was over.138  
“[T]he paradox suggested by the book’s title,” which concerned antitrust’s 
inconsistent premises, “some of them leading to the preservation of 
competition and others to its suppression,”139 was resolved in Bork’s mind.  
Bork also denounced “antitrust’s ideological drives.”140  Summarizing the 
book’s key arguments, Bork wrote:  “The argument of this book, of course, 
is that competition must be understood as the maximization of consumer 
welfare or, if you prefer, economic efficiency.”141   
Notwithstanding Bork’s many contributions to antitrust, the introduction 
of the “consumer welfare” standard as the goal of U.S. competition laws 
established the greatest antitrust paradox yet.  Being vague and ambiguous, 
 
 136. See generally Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser 
Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013); Orbach, supra note 4. 
 137. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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ed. 1993). 
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the standard accommodates inconsistent premises and interpretations.  
Utilizing Bork’s own analytical framework and arguments, the 
developments in antitrust during the past three decades require restoring 
“competition” as the goal of antitrust to resolve the most significant 
antitrust paradox today and promote clarity regarding the law. 
The debate over the goals of antitrust has been misplaced.142  It is a 
debate about a meaning of a phrase that should have never been part of 
antitrust discourse.  The regulation of competition cannot be expected to be 
simplistic and static.  Rather, it ought to nuanced, dynamic, and 
imperfect.143  Like other economic concepts, the concept of “competition” 
develops over time.144  When Bork described confusion in the perception of 
“competition” among courts, he compared perceptions in different eras145 
and demanded human judges to demonstrate the precision of a textbook.  
His critique of antitrust was not only imprecise, it has also hindered 
progress in antitrust. 
In United States v. Associated Press,146 Judge Learned Hand wrote:  
“Congress has incorporated into the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards 
of the common law, and by so doing has delegated to the courts the duty of 
fixing the standard for each case.”147  The argument infuriated Bork, who 
found Hand’s approach equivalent to “tennis with the net down.”148  But 
Judge Hand’s practical approach should be reheard. 
Antitrust should preserve some degree of flexibility in order to follow 
evolving understandings of economics.  The controversy over the goals of 
antitrust illustrates why past views should be reconsidered.  For example, in 
the course of the goals controversy, most scholars have probably used the 
word “welfare,” although the antitrust methodology does not accommodate 
welfare analysis.149  Many antitrust scholars equated consumer welfare and 
consumer surplus.  And others argued that “consumer welfare” should mean 
“social surplus” (an odd interpretation in itself).  The concept of surplus as 
a measure of economic welfare, however, has never been accepted in 
economics.150  Surplus in antitrust analysis may be useful, but the notion 
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that a simplistic economic concept could define the goal of antitrust is 
somewhat extreme. 
As Robert Bork pointed out, “[w]hen we talk of the desirability of 
competition we ordinarily have in mind . . . low prices, innovation, choice 
among differing products—all things we think of as being good for 
consumers.”151  During the first seven decades after the enactment of the 
Sherman Act, the preservation of competition was perceived as the most 
reasonable and practical end for antitrust.  Competition is still the most 
reasonable and practical goal for competition laws.  As a standard for 
competition laws, “competition” is not more confusing or abstract than 
“consumer welfare,” which has no particular meaning in antitrust.  It is 
therefore only logical to restore antitrust’s lost goal.  Whatever good ends 
the phrase “consumer welfare” may have once served, antitrust law should 
now lay it to rest.  Of course, the consumer welfare standard may continue 
serving as the stated goal of U.S. competition laws but, practically, antitrust 
has always been and will always be about the preservation of competition. 
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